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Abstract  
In this case study, we analyse to what extent the establishment of the Pilón Lajas Indigenous Terri-
tory and Biosphere Reserve in the Bolivian Amazon reflects the six elements of the concept of consti-
tutionality. Our analysis elucidates what happened during the second phase of establishment, in 
which land rights of lowland indigenous peoples were extended to collective territorial rights includ-
ing highland indigenous peoples and peasants. The case adds a dynamic perspective on the constitu-
tionality framework by providing a longitudinal analysis of a bottom-up institution building process 
for natural resource governance. 
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Introduction  
The decisions to establish the first protected areas in Bolivia in the 1960s were taken by the national 
government and local elites without any discussion or consultation with the local populations or a legal 
framework to coordinate conservation efforts at the national level. The resulting conflict, together 
with weak implementation, meant that conservation strategies were not very effective (Boillat et al. 
2010). In 1992, recognizing the failures of top-down approaches, the government promulgated the law 
of the “National System of Protected Areas” (Sistema Nacional de Áreas Protegidas, SNAP) (Law No. 
1333) that stated that the management of protected areas must be based on the inclusion of local 
indigenous populations (Alcoba 2004). This reflected the globally shared belief that participation of 
local people in decision-making processes and engagement in co-management are key for reducing 
conflicts over resources and increasing efficiency of conservation efforts (McLaughlin 2011; Pimbert 
and Pretty 1997).   
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However, critical reviews of this belief raised questions regarding what forms and under what condi-
tions participation is really effective. Some authors maintain that even if participation is happening 
and ownership is created, this should be understood as deriving from power exerted through local to 
national elites (Agrawal 2005; Nadasdy 2005). Others maintain that under certain conditions, bottom-
up institution building can create genuine ownership, even where quite diverse actors are involved. 
Haller et al. (2016) offer the concept of constitutionality to examine the conditions under which bot-
tom-up institution building can be successful and define six preconditions for constitutionality pro-
cesses: 1) local actors (heterogeneous in terms of power, economic assets, age, gender, etc.) perceive 
a need for new institutions to position themselves in changing contexts; 2) institution-building pro-
cesses are inclusive and address power asymmetries; 3) these processes build upon pre-existing local 
institutions; 4) outside catalyzing agents provide neutral platforms for negotiations; 5) local knowledge 
on resources is recognized; and 6) the resulting new institutions are recognized at a higher (national) 
level. 
The constitutionality framework thus emphasizes the views of local actors on participation and the 
strategies they employ when crafting institutions vis-à-vis comparably more powerful actors. Local ac-
tors experience a sense of ownership if economic, political, or social learning benefits are gained in the 
process. The framework hypothesizes that new institutional arrangements created through such a pro-
cess are more likely than those resulting from top-down participatory approaches to result in sustain-
able livelihoods and positive ecological outcomes (Haller 2010; Haller et al. 2016).  
In this case study, we analyse how the recognition – firstly of indigenous land rights, and secondly of 
indigenous territorial rights – operated at the local level of the Pilón Lajas Indigenous Territory and 
Biosphere Reserve in the Bolivian Amazon. We start with an analysis of the legal provisions on pro-
tected areas and indigenous collective land tenure that resulted from strong opposition of indigenous 
communities in this lowland area, as well as from indigenous organizations of the highlands and valleys 
of the Andes to existing national policies. This collective resistance by indigenous movements con-
cluded in the creation of nationwide “Indigenous Territories” (Tierras Comunitarias de Origen, TCO), 
and co-management structures at the local level. We then describe how the creation of  “the plurina-
tional state” and the expansion of land rights to territorial rights have challenged locally established 
institutions, and present an analysis of the implications of the extractive policies of this plurinational 
state from 2011 onwards, focusing on the state-controlled exploitation of mineral resources, fossil 
fuels, and hydroelectric energy. We conclude with a discussion of the factors that shape constitution-
ality processes over longer periods. 
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Background 
We selected the Pilón Lajas Indigenous Territory and Biosphere Reserve, located in the Andean foot-
hills of the La Paz and Beni departments and including four municipalities (Rurrenabaque, San Borja, 
Apolo and Palos Blancos), for the following criteria: a) it is one of the first TCOs created in Bolivia by 
Supreme Decree in 1992 as a response to the social movements in the 1990s. Collective land tenure of 
indigenous peoples was formally recognized in 1997 as a TCO, so the local indigenous organization, the 
Tsimane Mosetene Regional Council (Concejo Regional Tsimane Mosetene, CRTM), had several years 
of experience in territorial management; b) a system of co-management between the local indigenous 
organization and the National Service of Protected Areas (Servicio Nacional de Áreas Protegidas, 
SERNAP) had been created based on a social learning experience that requires ongoing re-negotiation 
and positioning of indigenous peoples vis-à-vis the state; and c) the TCO is inhabited by three indige-
nous peoples (Tsimane, Mosetene, and Tacana), who were granted a collective land title by the gov-
ernment. The transition zone of the Biosphere Reserve (BR), beside the Rurrenabaque–Yucumo road 
that borders Pilón Lajas, is inhabited by indigenous communities of Quechua and Aymara, who mi-
grated to the area from the highlands and valleys since the 1980s and are known locally as “colonos.”  
Pilón Lajas and its influence zone are inhabited by about 9,600 people, of whom about 15% (1,400) are 
lowland indigenous peoples who live within the Biosphere Reserve (data from 2004 in Bottazzi 2008). 
In its own census in 2010, the CRTM recorded a population of about 1,700 persons living in 22 villages 
(unpublished data provided by the CRTM). About 67% of the population are Tsimane, 13.4% Tacana, 
and 9.4% Mosetene. The remaining 10.2% belong to other indigenous groups such as Movima, Esse 
Ejja, or Lecos, or identify as mestizos.  The large majority (96.5%) of inter-ethnic marriages are within 
the Tacana communities along the Beni River (SERNAP and CRTM 2009). As with all indigenous nations 
of the Bolivian lowlands, the indigenous peoples of Pilón Lajas are ethnic minorities. In Bolivia, there 
are 11,173 Tacana, 6,464 Tsimane, and 1,989 Mosetene (INE 2013) (Fig.1). 
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Figure 1: Pilón Lajas Indigenous Territory and Biosphere Reserve  
 
The livelihoods of Tsimane and Mosetene households are largely based on forager-horticulturalist ac-
tivities with high levels of spatial mobility, while Tacana and colonos base their livelihoods mainly on 
agriculture (SERNAP and CRTM 2009). Foragers are often more marginalized and less organized than 
other indigenous groups, making meaningful participation in co-management structures more difficult 
(Minter et al. 2014). Our case study focuses on the forager-horticulturalist population of Pilón Lajas 
(Tsimane, Mosetene, and other lowland indigenous inhabitants embedded in Tsimane and Mosetene 
societies), who represent roughly 77% of the inhabitants of Pilón Lajas, or 11% of the total population 
including the transition zone. 
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 Mosetene and Tsimane are distinct but closely related ethnic minorities. Men hunt regularly, usually 
with shotguns or rifles. Fishing techniques (lines with baited hooks, nets, bow and arrow, plant venom) 
vary according to the water quality and type of water body. Most households breed chickens, and a 
few families raise pigs. Rice, plantains, manioc, and corn constitute the basic agricultural crops (the 
average cultivated area is 0.5 ha/household). These activities are predominantly for the subsistence of 
the family, while occasional surpluses are sold in Rurrenabaque.  
The majority of the Mosetene and Tsimane depend on the barter of woven palm leaves used in roof 
construction (Geonoma deversa) for commodity goods such as cooking oil, sugar, or batteries. Increas-
ingly, men (and a few women) temporarily engage in market-based activities, selling small quantities 
of timber, or taking occasional paid jobs.  
Methods 
The results are based on ethnographic research in Pilón Lajas during 14 months between July 2012 and 
August 2014. Our base was in Rurrenabaque, a town of about 13,000 inhabitants, where the CRTM 
and the local office of the SERNAP are located. There, we conducted semi-structured and unstructured 
interviews (Bernard 2006) with all members of the CRTM1, consultants to the indigenous organization 
financed by NGOs, the Directors2 of the Biosphere Reserve, rangers, and the administrative and plan-
ning staff. Main topics of the semi-structured interviews included the institutional history of Pilón La-
jas, co-management of the area, and roles of and relationships among actors, while the unstructured 
interviews provided information on day-to-day operations of institutions and related dynamics. Fur-
ther, the first author observed the interactions of these actors in the facilities both institutions share 
in order to assess co-management structures in practice.  
The first author undertook regular field trips lasting from 5 to 16 days to the communities along the 
Quiquibey River. A significant amount of time was spent in two Mosetene-majority communities about 
6 hours (Gredal) and 1.5 days (San Luis Grande)3 by motorized canoe from Rurrenabaque. Shorter visits 
were made to seven other Mostene and Tsimane communities along the Quiquibey River (Bolsón, San 
Luis Chico, San Bernardo, Corte, Bisal, Asunción del Quiquibey) and the Beni River (Charque), as well 
as one visit to a colono-settlement (El Palmar) along the Rurrenabaque-Yucumo (Fig. 1). 
                                                          
1 The executive committee of the CRTM consists of a President, a Vice-President, and one person responsible 
for the issues Land and Territory, Health, Education, and Gender.  
2 During the research period, the Biosphere Reserve saw three Directors, of which two were rangers, assuming 
their position ad interim.  
3 Household and village size vary significantly over time due to the high mobility of residents. During the re-
search period, between 8 and 15 adults lived in Gredal, and between 8 and 12 adults lived in San Luis Grande.  
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The main methods we used in the communities were participatory observation (DeWalt and DeWalt 
2011; Hammersley and Atkinson 2007) and unstructured interviews (Bernard 2006). The first author 
engaged actively in the daily activities of various women, men, and children, gaining insights into how 
people occupy space and interact within and across the territory. Additionally, participatory mapping 
and transect walks (Chambers 1994) were conducted in both communities, providing information on 
conceptualizations of space and territory as well as on occupation of space and related knowledge.  
Results 
The neoliberal state and the creation of TCOs 
National Bolivian society long considered the forests of the Amazon basin “empty,” and indigenous 
peoples of the Bolivian lowlands were invisible or regarded as marginal (Martinez-Rodriguez 2009). 
The 1953 Agrarian Reform abolished the feudal hacienda system in the Bolivian valleys and highlands 
and declared the selvícolas (woodland or jungle dwellers) to be in a “savage state and have a primitive 
organization” and thus to remain “under the protection of the State” (Decree Law 3464 1953).  A gov-
ernment-driven “colonization of the Amazon” by Andean indigenous peoples started in 1980s with the 
expansion of the agricultural frontier along newly built roads. Indigenous people living in the area for 
centuries were confronted with the rapid expansion of illegal logging by colonos, and found that the 
extensive territories needed for their semi-sedentary subsistence were under threat (Bottazzi and Rist 
2012). Members of the Guaraní, Ayoreo, Guarayo, and Chiquitano indigenous people started to organ-
ize themselves with the support of German anthropologist Jürgen Riester, founding in 1982 the Con-
federation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia (Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas del Oriente Boliviano, 
CIDOB), an umbrella organization that today represents 34 indigenous peoples (Anthias and Radcliffe 
2015; Assies 2006; Hirsch 2003). In March 1990, this new indigenous movement organized the “March 
for Territory and Dignity” to bring their political agenda to national attention, primarily claiming recog-
nition of their rights and territories. Indigenous organizations from the highlands supported their 
claims, contributing to the emergence of lowland indigenous peoples as a new social and political force 
(Assies 2006; Sanchez-Lopez 2015). One year later Bolivia ratified the ILO Convention 169 on Indige-
nous and Tribal Peoples. This coincided with the political transformation of the country, initiated with 
a constitutional reform in 1994, recognizing the multi-ethnic and “pluricultural” character of the State 
and the right of indigenous peoples to their territories,  established through the promulgation of  Law 
1715 (the National Agrarian Reform Institute Law or Ley INRA) in 1996, which introduced the legal 
category of collective property “Tierras Comunitarias de Origen” (TCOs) (Assies 2006). TCOs are de-
fined as geographic areas that constitute the habitat of indigenous peoples and communities, to which 
they traditionally have had access, and where they maintain and develop their own ways of economic, 
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social, and cultural organization. TCOs establish clear boundaries and are “inalienable, indivisible, irre-
versible, collective, composed of communities or associations, indefeasible and exempt from the stat-
utes of limitations” (Law No. 1715, Art. 41.I.5). The name indicates that these areas are conceptually 
based on a notion of land limited to the topsoil: indigenous peoples do not have property rights on 
water, forest cover, or mineral resources, but “have the right to participate in the sustainable use of 
renewable resources” (Law No. 1715, Art. 3.III). Today, over 200 TCOs and TIOCs (Territorios Indigena 
Originario Campesino, see below) exist, spanning over 24 million hectares (56% is located in the low-
lands and 44% in the highlands and valleys) (INRA 2015). While resulting from demand by indigenous 
communities in the lowlands (supported by indigenous groups of the highlands and valleys), creation 
of the legal category of TCOs, and thus of the Pilón Lajas Biosphere Reserve, was a top-down process 
that originated from the national political elite to resolve its conflict of legitimacy and was rooted in a 
logic of “multicultural neoliberalism” (González 2010; Van Cott 2001). 
The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) pro-
posed an area of 280,000 hectares as a national park under the Law on Forest Life, National Parks, 
Hunting, and Fishing (Decree Law No. 12301) of 1975, as it was judged that its ecosystem had not been 
sufficiently represented in Bolivia’s protected areas network. The local Tsimane were considered an 
“endangered species” under threat of extinction (Márquez Guerra 2015). Between 1976 and 1977, the 
Man and Biosphere (MAB) programme designated 118 biosphere reserves across the world in a “fast 
track” mode. These were areas that had both representative and unique biomes corresponding to the 
main objective of the MAB programme to “safeguard the genetic diversity of species” (UNESCO 1974: 
11). Pilón Lajas, however, remained a paper park, and there was no administration or conservation 
activity in the years following its creation (Bottazzi 2008; Pauquet 2005). 
Following the Indigenous March for Territory and Dignity in 1990, the Bolivian president declared nine 
“Indigenous Territories” by Supreme Decree4, including Pilón Lajas (Assies 2006). This included the 
recognition that the local Tsimane and Mosetene indigenous population had the right to the “rational 
use of natural resources” as established by the legislation, and that no new concessions for logging, 
mining, or oil would be granted. The decree further recognized the area’s status as a Biosphere Reserve 
for the protection of biodiversity and genetic integrity of the flora and fauna (Supreme Decree No. 
23110). According to our informants, neither the indigenous population nor their leaders were con-
sulted on the demarcation of the limits of the area (instead, the 400,000-hectare area defined by the 
MAB national committee was adopted), nor were they informed or consulted about the creation of 
the protected area. The state’s interests in the natural resources of the area remained high, and after 
                                                          
4 Tsimane, Multiétnico 1, Sirionó, and Isiboro-Securé in 1990, and Weenhayek, Araona, Pilón Lajas, and Yuqui in 
1992 (see Law No. 1715  1996). 
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creation of the protected area and indigenous territory, it granted concessions to several logging com-
panies, as well as to two oil exploration companies (REPSOL and PETROBRAS) (Laats et al. 2012). 
During the first years after creation of the reserve (1993-1998), the French NGO Vétérinaires Sans 
Frontières (VSF) assumed the management of the area with financial support from the European Union 
and the Swiss Development and Cooperation Agency. The NGO elaborated a five-year management 
plan, but as the colonists’ interest in participating in the assessments was low, the plan was completed 
without their involvement. Tensions between the indigenous population, colonos, and the NGO arose 
as economic development projects carried out by VSF largely benefitted the colonos, while the indig-
enous population was the target of conservation activities. At the same time, VSF found itself in the 
crossfire of local elites and colono organizations, as it supported indigenous peoples in expelling log-
ging companies from the Biosphere Reserve. Following escalation of the conflict with the colonos, VSF 
withdrew in 1996. In 1998, the newly founded National Service for Protected Areas (SERNAP) (Supreme 
Decree No. 25158) took over the management of the area (Bottazzi 2008; Pauquet 2005), implement-
ing the General Rules for Protected Areas (Supreme Decree No. 24781). 
In 1997, the Indigenous Territory became a TCO recognized by the Land Law No. 1715. This title con-
solidated collective rights of use and access for the Tsimane and Mosetene population in Pilón Lajas, 
represented by the CRTM. The Tacana, who were not considered by the Supreme Decree in 1992, were 
recognized as co-owners of the TCO through their affiliation to the CRTM. Access rights of the 10% of 
the population that does not belong to any of these three groups were never formally defined. In 
practice they are tied to social norms concerning marriage and kinship, as well as to natural resource 
use as defined by informal inter-ethnic institutional arrangements.  
The double status of the area as a TCO and Biosphere Reserve resulted in legislative protection of the 
land (Law No. 1715  ; Law No. 3545) and the environment (Law No. 1333). This suited the interests of 
both conservationists and indigenous communities, and helped to reduce economic pressure on the 
natural resources of Pilón Lajas. The large logging concessions were reversed in the late 1990s 
(Pauquet 2005), while both oil exploration blocks were halted in 2002 and 2004, respectively, for being 
situated in a protected area. In addition, deforestation within Pilón Lajas due to the rapid expansion 
of the agricultural frontier was slowed down through the delineation of its boundaries (Bottazzi and 
Dao 2013; SERNAP and CRTM 2009). The Land Law also recognized the property rights of colonos, who 
until 1993 had received either individual small properties of 25 hectares, individual medium properties, 
or collective titles (colonies) as a group (Bottazzi and Rist 2012).   
In 2004, a co-management system was negotiated and implemented by the local branch of SERNAP 
and the CRTM. This collaboration between a government institution and an indigenous organization 
attracted NGOs and international donors, such as the Department for International Development 
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(DFID), USAID, World Bank, Conservation International (CI), Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), and 
others, making Pilón Lajas one of the better protected areas in Bolivia (Bottazzi 2008). The legal status 
of the TCOs in general, and the creation of Pilón Lajas in particular, thus significantly increased state 
recognition of the indigenous population.  
Around the same time, the relationship between the indigenous inhabitants of Pilón Lajas and the 
colonos living in its transition zone began to deteriorate. In 2005, about 150 people claiming to belong 
to the Landless Movement (Movimiento Sin Tierra) settled around the Laguna Azul, considered a sa-
cred space by the Mosetene and Tsimane, and started dividing agricultural land into parcels and ex-
tracting timber. The indigenous population organized, and with the support of SERNAP expelled the 
illegal settlers (Fundación Tierra 2010; Surkin et al. 2010). In the same year, the land titling process 
began, contributing to the intensification of conflict. The process of land registration (saneamiento) 
was encoded in a law (1715) that combined neoliberal principles (liberalization of the land market) and 
social justice principles (recognition of indigenous peoples’ territorial rights) (Assies 2006) and priori-
tized third-party claims over the recognition of TCOs (Reyes-García et al. 2014). The land titling process 
in Pilón Lajas concluded in January 2008 with certification in the name of the CRTM only after 53,874 
hectares of the TCO had been allocated as individual titles to colonos settling in the southern part of 
the area.  The boundaries of the TCO and the Biosphere Reserve therefore do not overlap completely 
(SERNAP and CRTM 2009).  
The elaboration of the second management plan, the “Management Plan and Life Plan of the BR-TCO” 
for the period 2007-2017, was funded and led by WCS whose goal was to develop a document reflect-
ing both conservationist and indigenous views as the basis for the co-management of the area. The 
indigenous population was thus included at an early stage and more thoroughly than in the first plan, 
although colonists were not considered stakeholders (Bottazzi 2008; Surkin et al. 2010). In 2010, the 
CRTM was awarded the Equator Prize of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in 
recognition of its efforts to reduce poverty through biodiversity conservation, and a Special Recogni-
tion for applied indigenous knowledge (UNDP 2012). A Supreme Decree developed by SERNAP in co-
ordination with indigenous organizations from the lowlands and highlands to formalize co-manage-
ment of protected areas was not however approved by the Cabinet of Ministers (Espinoza T. 2012). 
Nevertheless, thus far the process corresponds largely to the principles of constitutionality for success-
ful bottom-up institution-building process: a heterogeneous set of local actors calling for new institu-
tions (indigenous territories, co-management structures – element 1) that build on traditional institu-
tions for resource governance (common vs. private property – element 3), negotiation of co-manage-
ment of the area has increased the sense of ownership among lowland indigenous communities (ele-
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ment 2), the NGO WCS served, to a degree, as an outside catalyzing agent (element 4), and the Indig-
enous Territory has been acknowledged at a higher (national) level through the creation of the TCO, 
increasing the bargaining power of the indigenous population (element 6). However, both the local 
(WCS, park authorities) and the national level (legislators) failed to understand indigenous resource 
governance (element 5), and the colonos were excluded from the institution building process (element 
2). Nevertheless, most interviewees concur that the double status as protected area and indigenous 
territory allowed for significantly improved livelihood outcomes and the sustainability of natural re-
sources and the ecosystem. 
The “plurinational” state’s inter-ethnic focus 
At the national level, the major indigenous and peasant organizations5 formed the “Pact of Unity,” a 
political alliance that paved the way for fundamental political changes, such as the election of Evo 
Morales as the first indigenous president in 2005, the convening of a Constituent Assembly in which 
the organizations from the Pact of Unity were strongly represented, and the resulting New Political 
Constitution of 2009 that declared Bolivia a “plurinational” state (Bottazzi and Rist 2012; Fundación 
Tierra 2010; Schavelzon 2012) and transformed the recognition of the right to land established by the 
land law in the form of the TCOs into the recognition of the right to a territory by introducing Indige-
nous Native Peasant Territories (Territorios Indigena Originario Campesino, TIOC) (Garcés 2011). This 
new legal category is based on a reinterpretation of fragmented rural identities through the introduc-
tion of a unifying category of collective citizenship, the indigenous native peasant (Fontana 2014). The 
change in collective land tenure from TCO to TIOC thus poses new questions of access to and exclusion 
from territories and natural resources (Bottazzi and Rist 2012; Sanchez-Lopez 2015; Tockman and 
Cameron 2014).  
The constitutional anchoring of the collective tenure category as TIOCs enhances the rights of all the 
country’s indigenous nations to their territories by extending land rights to territorial rights. Wherever 
TIOCs overlap with protected areas, co-management based on the norms and proceedings of the in-
digenous peoples should apply (NCPE Art 385.II). The automatic conversion of TCOs to TIOCs was le-
gally established in 2010 (Supreme Decree No. 727).  
However, despite this constitutional valorization of plurality, autonomy, and territorial rights of the 
indigenous population within Bolivian society, the Tsimane, Mosetene, and Tacana of Pilón Lajas ve-
hemently oppose the conversion of their TCO into a TIOC, chiefly because it would reduce the power 
                                                          
5 CIDOB; Unique Confederation of Rural Laborers of Bolivia (CSUTCB); Confederation of Peasant Indigenous Na-
tive Women “Bartolina Sisa” (CNCIOB-BS); Syndicalist Confederation of Intercultural Communities of Bolivia 
(CSCIB); and the Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ). 
11 
 
of the three groups indigenous to the area relative to the colono organizations of the region. The Ay-
mara and Quechua settlers in the transition zone today outnumber the indigenous population of the 
whole area by 4 to 1 (Bottazzi 2008, unpublished data provided by CRTM). The colono communities 
find it unacceptable that roughly 1,700 people possess nearly 400,000 hectares of land, while they 
have to limit themselves to 25 hectares (or less, due to inheritance rules). The settlers are pushing for 
the expansion of the agricultural frontier, increasing pressure on indigenous communities, mainly 
along the road. The indigenous population fears that through the conversion of the status of Pilón Lajas 
to a TIOC, the colonos along the road could claim access or even property rights based on this title. The 
Tsimane and Mosetene therefore firmly protect this border.  
The rejection of legal permeability does not however extend to practices of social permeability. Our 
research reveals complex social networks among the inhabitants of Pilón Lajas, other indigenous ter-
ritories, and the Andean settlers that are not territorially bounded, but extend over the traditionally 
occupied areas around San Borja, Maniqui River, Alto Beni, and beyond. This is reflected in the long-
term movements related to the foundation of the Tsimane and Mosetene settlements in Pilón Lajas 
(Fig. 2). Tsimane and Mosetene are both semi-nomadic; permanent settlements within Pilón Lajas are 
relatively new. The oldest current settlements date back to the 1960s, while temporary camps have 
existed longer.  
The TCO Mosetene, contiguous to the southwestern border of Pilón Lajas, and the TCO Tsimane, sep-
arated by only 10 km, are both more densely populated than Pilón Lajas6. Tsimane and Mosetene from 
Pilón Lajas all have family members in these areas, and the practice of sóbaqui, i.e., visiting relatives, 
which is of significant local cultural and economic importance, is common. These visits last between a 
few days and several months, and usually made to access natural resources or to find spouses (Fig. 3). 
Spatial mobility is thus used as a strategy to create and maintain kinship relations, friendships, and 
political alliances. Related to this is flexibility in self-identification in terms of ethnicity according to the 
social environment in which a person sees him/herself embedded. Statements such as “my father was 
Tsimane, my mother a Yuracaré, but I am Mosetene” are not unusual. The emic notion of territoriality 
is hence unbounded and dynamic. Access to and use of natural resources is based on a conceptualiza-
tion of the environment as constituted of human and non-human communities interconnected 
through diverse forms of social relationships. Hence, to some elderly Tsimane and Mosetene (particu-
larly women) the notion of a bounded territory remains inconceivable. 
                                                          
6 The TCO’s Tsimane and Mosetene both have a population density of about 2 people/km2  (Ringhofer 2010; 
von Stosch 2010), while the population density in Pilón Lajas is about 0.5 people/km2 (Bottazzi 2008). 
12 
 
 
Figure 2: Long term movement patterns (years/decades) within the Tsimane/Mosetene territorial archipelago  
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Figure 3: Short-term movement patterns of villagers of the Quiquibey River  
However, many families of the TCO Tsimane and TCO Mosetene have shifted their livelihood strategies 
to logging (Reyes-García et al. 2014; von Stosch 2010; Zycherman 2013), an option that is not viable 
for the inhabitants of the Pilón Lajas Biosphere Reserve, which limits the possibilities for commercial 
extraction of timber. Hence, the abundance of and dependency on game and fish in these TCOs is 
lower than in Pilón Lajas. Tsimane and Mosetene from the Maniqui and Alto Beni regions visiting rela-
tives in Pilón Lajas have the right to access natural resources. Locals often complain that their visiting 
relatives from outside the TCO hunt and fish excessively, and hence disturb the relationship with the 
Owner spirits of the animals and the fish. While some residents denounce excessive resource use at 
the CRTM and SERNAP, generally no sanctions are enforced. Most people expect the Owner spirits to 
punish infringers of hunting and fishing rules. Although the natural resource base in Pilón Lajas is cur-
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rently healthy, some interviewees were afraid that these dynamics, combined with the ongoing pres-
sure from settlers, might lead to overexploitation such as they experienced in the past in their areas 
of origin. We therefore conclude that in the emic notion of Tsimane and Mosetene in Pilón Lajas gov-
ernance, rather than being defined by legal categories (as is the case for the state and peasants) is 
determined by customs and beliefs that regulate interactions among human societies as well as among 
human and non-human societies, such as Owner spirits. 
Another dynamic arises from the expansion of intermarriage between the Tsimane communities along 
the road and colonos, transforming the social institutions that define access to common pool resources 
for local actors. Inter-ethnic marriages are not only frequent among lowland indigenous peoples but 
increasingly frequent among lowland and highland indigenous populations. Marriage, like kinship, pro-
vides access to the common property resources of Pilón Lajas. Both men and women related to Mo-
setene or Tsimane through marriage along the Quiquibey River have integrated themselves into the 
way of life of the local communities, following customary norms on resource use and social relation-
ships. However, male settlers along the road who marry women from Tsimane families but nonethe-
less maintain close relationships with their relatives of Aymara or Quechua origin often continue using 
the land according to settler traditions. As their livelihood strategy remains based mainly on agricul-
ture, this means they clear on average more forest for permanent plots – up to 5 hectares – than the 
Tsimane families clear under the shifting cultivation (0.5 to 1 hectare). Inter-ethnic marriages also al-
low Tsimane to gain access to agricultural lands beyond the TCO that are part of the land market. 
Related to this process, we observed that Tsimane communities along the road, although situated 
within the TCO, have begun to treat land as private property (Bottazzi 2009). Some communities intend 
to create communal territories in order to exclude the other members of the TCO from what is sup-
posedly “their” land. In this context, clearly defined boundaries have extended from the TCO to the 
community to the individual plot, changing land use patterns considerably along the road, and high-
lighting the profound transformations Tsimane society is undergoing. 
The TCO introduced and legally defined borders that from an emic perspective and in social practice 
are permeable. Thus the TIOCs, designed to overcome social fragmentation based on ethnicity, seem 
to better match the social reality of indigenous peoples in Bolivia. However, the lowland indigenous 
communities perceive the TIOCs as undermining their bargaining power vis-à-vis highland colonos in 
determining their way of life and related land use. Consequently, conditions for a constitutionality 
process have in this case been reduced significantly by the introduction of a tenure category aimed at 
a better conceptualization of indigenous practices. The former mismatch between legal delineations 
and social permeability of the TCOs thus disappeared as borders became important for political rea-
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sons and clearly defined boundaries became acceptable to maintain the internal function of social per-
meability. In this sense, despite violating local notions of permeability, the TCO became a political ad-
vantage for Tsimane and Mosetene.  
The shift to a neo-extractivist focus  
In December 2011 the indigenous organizations CIDOB and CONAMAQ withdrew from the “Pact of 
Unity” as a result of the controversy surrounding a planned road through the Indigenous Territory and 
National Park Isiboro Securé (TIPNIS). The remaining three peasant and colono organizations rein-
forced their alignment with the Morales government over this conflict (Rojas M. 2011). Numerous in-
habitants of Pilón Lajas joined the “IX Indigenous March in Defense of the TIPNIS” to La Paz to defend 
the constitutional rights of lowland indigenous peoples against the neo-extractivist agenda of the gov-
ernment. The TIPNIS case illustrates the plural conceptions of development and well-being in the 
“new” Bolivia of Morales, which is based on the extraction of non-renewable resources and energy 
production for export (Agenda Patriótica 2025 2013). The revenues are used primarily to finance three 
social cash-transfer programs7 (Fontana 2013b). Pilón Lajas is one of seven areas that the government 
opened up for fossil fuel exploration and exploitation (Imaña 2015). In addition, it has reactivated as a 
national priority (Supreme Decree No. 29191), an old proposal for a hydroelectric plant on the Beni 
River (“El Bala”)  that was highly criticized by indigenous peoples and conservationists, as it would 
entail the flooding of the major part of Pilón Lajas and a significant area of the Madidi National Park 
(Geodata 2016)8.  
Further, colono organizations as well as the agri-business are now allying themselves with the govern-
ment to expand the agricultural frontier. The 2015 national agricultural summit tripled the agricultural 
and livestock economy of the country, including the extension of the area permitted for smallholder 
deforestation from 5 to 20 hectares (La Razón "Sobre Normativa Agropecuaria"  2015; Paz Ballivián 
2015). This  increases pressure on protected areas and the TCOs of lowland indigenous communities, 
which are framed as the “new latifundios” by the peasant organizations (Sanchez-Lopez 2015).9 
                                                          
7 Bono Juancito Pinto (incentive for school attendance), Bono Juana Azurduy (support to new mothers), and 
Renta Dignidad (universal pension fund).  
8 Based on a feasibility study conducted by the Italian company Geodata in 2016, the project was recently 
adapted to consist of two dams, the Chepite and El Bala. The El Bala artificial lake would, at full capacity, flood 
an area of 9300 hectares, of which roughly 4800 hectares would directly affect Pilón Lajas (Geodata 2016). 
9 Indeed, lowland indigenous peoples, representing roughly 5% of the national population, claim 21% of the 
national area as indigenous territories (Fundación Tierra 2011; INE 2013). However, it should be noted that 
lowland indigenous peoples’ lifestyles that are based on hunting and shifting cultivation that require larger ar-
eas with little human encroachment. 
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In addition, the regional road infrastructure program IIRSA (Initiative for the Integration of the Regional 
Infrastructure of South America) is expected to increase migration into the buffer area of Pilón Lajas, 
as the road flanking the area is part of the “Northern Corridor” linking Bolivia with Peru and Brazil 
(Laats et al. 2012). In 2011, negotiations began with the Bolivian Road Administration and the Inter-
American Development Bank but were put on hold due to CRTM’s participation in the IX Indigenous 
March. By 2013, negotiations appeared to be successful, and CRTM was promised compensation of 
USD 300,000. The CRTM and the assembly of Corregidores decided to invest this money in 40 km of 
fences along the territory borders that are particularly contested, as well as in training and equipping 
“territorial guards” (CRTM 2011-2013 2013). However, neither the actual construction of the fences 
nor the recruitment of territorial guards has begun, as there are disagreements between the CRTM 
and the government on financial management aspects of the project.  
Another direct consequence of external pressures related to government-driven development plans 
was the replacement of the political representatives of the CRTM in 2015. While the “river communi-
ties” and the former CRTM representatives chose open opposition towards the government, the “road 
communities,” a majority, favored a cooperative approach and initiated replacement of all members 
of the CRTM. It is probable that CRTM representation will oscillate between opposition and pro-gov-
ernment factions, depending on internal and external dynamics. 
While in 2005 the relationship of the indigenous population with the state helped the inhabitants of 
Pilón Lajas to defend their interests, ten years later the situation has changed. From the CRTM’s per-
spective, the major threats to the integrity of their territory and hence to the livelihoods of Tsimane, 
Mosetene, and Tacana now come from the state and SERNAP is no longer considered a reliable part-
ner. The Biosphere Reserve authorities and rangers find themselves unable to support actions against 
the government’s development plan, despite their concerns about possible impacts of oil exploitation 
or the hydroelectric dam, for fear of losing their jobs. The Bolivian government has established its 
political legitimacy and moral authority by “speaking like an indigenous state” (Zimmerer 2013). How-
ever, it has not yet overcome the discrepancy between the growth-driven neo-extractivist approach 
of the Patriotic Agenda, and the indigenous rights and decolonization discourse embodied, for exam-
ple, in the Law of Mother Earth and Integral Development to Live Well (Law No. 300) (Artaraz and 
Calestani 2015; Fontana 2013a; Zimmerer 2015). 
The concept of ownership developed by the indigenous communities at the beginning of the constitu-
tionality process will not automatically remain stable over longer time periods due to various factors 
including changes in their emic perception of territory in their worldview, changes in the political 
power relations among different indigenous actors, or changes in the relative importance accorded a 
protected area in government development agendas.    
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Discussion  
The strong social movements of the indigenous communities of Bolivia initially successfully challenged 
the top-down governance of natural resources promoted by the government’s neoliberal policies caus-
ing a significant increase in the state recognition of indigenous rights, and hence their bargaining power 
vis-à-vis the state, culminating in the creation of TCOs. Although the establishment of the TCO in Pilón 
Lajas was a top-down process, it offered opportunities for its inhabitants to participate in its manage-
ment. The CRTM, representing the interests of the indigenous Tsimane, Mosetene, and Tacana, allied 
with the local SERNAP over common goals, notably keeping loggers, oil companies, and colonos out of 
the area. This collaboration eventually led to the creation of a co-management system that increased 
the sense of ownership of the indigenous populations in the institution-building process, particularly 
of those involved in the CRTM, the SERNAP (as indigenous rangers), and collective actions. Neverthe-
less, resource governance in Pilón Lajas is shaped by formal state institutions (TCO, Biosphere Reserve) 
that represent notions of governance that do not correspond to the lowland indigenous concepts of a 
permeable and changing  territory. The legal categories introduced by the neoliberal state were based 
on a delineation of borders and rules concerning resource use formulated on scientific assumptions of 
ecosystem management (Muller 2014; Umans and Arce 2014).    
Our case study shows that where top-down institutional arrangements do not fully fit local realities, 
people develop hybrid forms of formal and informal institutions to dynamically regulate the access to 
territory and natural resources (Bennett and Sierra 2014; Bollig and Menestrey Schwieger 2014; 
Cleaver and de Koning 2016; Gombay 2014). People affected by processes such as the creation of the 
TCO or by the top-down Biosphere Reserve in Pilón Lajas were not just recipients of new institutional 
arrangements, but attempted to define them according to their own world view. The spatial delinea-
tion approach of the INRA law separated territorial from social contexts, while the Biosphere Reserve 
separated economic from socio-cultural and local institutional contexts. The TCOs thus resulted in 
highly fragmented entities (see also Anthias and Radcliffe 2015; Reyes-García et al. 2014; Umans and 
Arce 2014). Reyes-García et al. (2014) suggest that the recognition of indigenous land claims has led 
to archipelagos of territories. Apart from private lands, indigenous communities in Bolivia are now 
distributed across different TCOs: the Tsimane currently over four, the Mosetene over two, and the 
Tacana over five, of which only Pilón Lajas is uninterrupted. In practice, access to natural resources is 
not created through membership of a TCO, but through kinship and marriage. Through the social insti-
tution of sóbaqui, the bounded territory of Pilón Lajas is extended and interconnected with the TCOs 
of Tsimane and Mosetene as well as with non-indigenous communities and towns (Figs. 2 and 3).  
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By maintaining links between the territorial archipelagos created by the tenure formalization process, 
the inhabitants treated the clearly delineated borders of Pilón Lajas as flexible and dynamics. The in-
digenous population recognized the value of the protected area to defend their territorial claims 
against further fragmentation and commercial interests (West et al. 2006). Top-down governance can 
thus in certain cases be important for enhancing bargaining power of the local population when rela-
tive values are changing.  
However, power asymmetries may become irreconcilable if interests in an area and its natural re-
sources and development potential are shifting. In Bolivia, the relationship of the state with indigenous 
peoples has evolved considerably over the last two decades. The unambiguous recognition of indige-
nous rights and principles after the election of President Morales, endorsed in the New Political Con-
stitution of 2009, led to an unprecedented alliance between the state and indigenous and peasant 
organizations that at first positively influenced constitutionality processes in Pilón Lajas: territorial 
rights were formally recognized through a collective land title, inhabitants started to develop a sense 
of ownership in relation to particular collective action, and co-management with SERNAP led to an 
improved natural resource base.  
However, other, more powerful, actors such as the colonos also built strategic alliances with the state. 
The comparative advantage of the indigenous partnership with the state started to shift when the 
government began to prioritize national economic and social development over specific priorities of 
indigenous communities. The introduction of the TIOCs marked an expanded constitutionality process 
at the national level, as it incorporated perspectives and needs of the highland and valley indigenous 
populations, focusing on inter-ethnic rights. The related territorial permeability seems to better fit in-
digenous notions of spatial governance. However, since the colonos and coca-growing peasants are 
the strongest constituency within the governing Movement Toward Socialism party (MAS), the TIOCs 
not only strengthen their land claims, but also allow the state to expand its influence in the areas that 
were under the sovereignty of lowland indigenous peoples (Sanchez-Lopez 2015). The state’s interest 
in Pilón Lajas and its buffer zone for energy production and infrastructure projects changed relative 
land values of the area to a degree that the bargaining power of the CRTM dropped significantly. 
Hence, the indigenous populations have lost their once most important ally, the state. The govern-
ment’s shift from a top-down driven development approach to neo-extractivist policies is perceived by 
the Mosetene and Tsimane as undermining their right to self-determination as established by the Con-
stitution, and lowering their bargaining power to define their own development vis-à-vis the state and 
the colonos.  Against this background, the clearly delineated boundaries of the TCO became a useful 
tool to protect indigenous priorities. Another strategy, chosen by the majority of the Tsimane road 
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communities, is an attempt to recreate the alliance with the state and colonos in order to regain their 
bargaining power. 
Conclusion 
Our case study of the Indigenous Territory and Biosphere Reserve Pilón Lajas shows that the elements 
of constitutionality defining bottom-up institution-building processes for natural resource governance 
are dynamic and thus positive outcomes cannot be assumed to persist once successful new institutions 
are agreed upon, but instead require constant re-negotiation among all parties. In this particular case, 
we analyzed two factors that contributed to potentially unsustainable outcomes over longer periods 
of time. 
We show that it is pivotal for emerging constitutionality processes that governance frameworks take 
into account emic human–nature relationships (Blaser 2009; Muller 2014). In this case, the wide range 
of notions regarding territorial occupation, development, and conservation of the impacted actors 
were not sufficiently incorporated into the institution-building process. As a consequence, not all de-
veloped a sense of ownership of the co-management structures that is a necessary condition for de-
velopment of successful institutions. In settings where the actors are particularly heterogeneous, e.g., 
different indigenous populations, colonos, state actors, and conservationists, a special focus is required 
on how the involved actors perceive their environment and their position within it in order that these 
more fundamental perspectives are reflected in territorial dynamics and related forms of territorial 
occupation and use of natural resources. The mismatch between external and internal conceptualiza-
tions of governance – and the missing platform for exchange to bring together different worldviews 
shaping resource governance – challenges the success of an initially promising constitutionality process 
in Pilón Lajas (Rathwell et al. 2015; Tengö et al. 2014). 
Our analysis also shows that although recognition of the new institutions by the state is a prerequisite 
for constitutionality processes to proceed, it may also become a factor contributing to the dissolution 
of the new institutional settings if these processes are co-opted by the state to advance interests in-
compatible with the original objectives that informed the institution-building process. Within the ne-
oliberal state, the TCO served to defend indigenous rights against expansion of the agricultural frontier 
and commercial interests. Since the “plurinational” state under the MAS government itself claims to 
be ‘indigenous’ (Canessa 2014; Sanchez-Lopez 2015), the boundary of identity, and hence the grounds 
for articulation of  claims to specific rights, dissolves. The struggle is no longer one of “indigenous peo-
ples” versus “the state,” but rather revolves around discourses of the collective indigenous native peas-
ant citizen and related politics of resource extraction for the well-being of Bolivia’s majority on the one 
hand, and the protection of cultural diversity and marginal peoples on the other (Canessa 2014; 
Fontana 2013a, 2014).    
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In this changing context, the inhabitants of Pilón Lajas first employed defensive strategies such as clear 
opposition towards the state and increased delineation of borders. Recognizing the comparative ad-
vantage of participation in institution-building processes, based on their experience of co-manage-
ment of the area, the lowland indigenous peoples of Pilón Lajas have decided to again seek alliance 
with the state and colonos in order to participate in the next round of negotiations concerning the 
governance of natural resources in the area they share. 
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